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Figure 1. Example of clowning.
Extreme facial expression (imitation of great 
grandmother’s face while snoring) repeated 
following others’ laughter.Our revised understanding of the 
organization of the avian brain also 
provides us with an opportunity 
to investigate the neural basis of 
emotion in birds. We could also 
apply physiological techniques used 
with mammals to record autonomic 
responses to emotional material 
or affective experiences. However, 
these would suffer from the same 
problems as mammals, as changes 
in heart rate, blood pressure, skin 
conductance, cortisol levels, and 
so on can be weak correlates of a 
specific emotional response. For 
example, heart rate can increase both 
as a result of being frightened and the 
result of seeing a loved one. The best 
opportunity for progress is to bring 
all these techniques together into a 
comprehensive study of emotional 
states, one species at a time.
What are the implications if we 
conclude that birds do not have 
fun? Our animal welfare laws are 
based largely around an attempt to 
provide animals with an absence of 
pain and suffering. We would also 
like them to be happy. Although a 
noble pursuit, as yet there is very little 
scientific evidence to bear on what 
a happy animal would look like if we 
saw one. It is therefore of primary 
importance that we develop sensible, 
scientifically-based methods to 
determine precisely what constitutes 
an animal feeling happy, sad, joyful 
and whether it can have fun. We can 
then use such information to enhance 
their lives, rather than attributing our 
own ideas on what they do and do 
not need based on introspection and 
anthropomorphism. 
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clowning in infancy
Vasudevi Reddy1 and Gina Mireault2
“… do not take from me your 
laughter..... it opens for me all the 
doors of life”
— Pablo Neruda
Before they speak or walk or crawl, 
infants joke. Infant laughter captured 
the attention of Aristotle, who thought 
it was the sign of the entry of the 
soul into the body, and of Darwin, 
who noted its emergence in the 
fourth month of life. Darwin saw such 
laughter as the early appreciation 
of humour, the presence at this age 
of which should not surprise us too 
much, given the early emergence 
of play in other mammals. In the 
twentieth century, however, these 
observations faded from scientific 
attention; humour began to be seen as 
an intellectual achievement requiring 
complex cognitive abilities, with infant 
laughter seen merely as a reaction 
to external stimuli. Recent research, 
however, has uncovered remarkable 
cognitive and emotional sensitivities 
in very young infants. And, as it turns 
out, humour and laughter in infants 
offer a rich source of insights into 
their understanding of the world, 
and indeed for our understanding of 
infants. The study of infant humour is 
no joke.
One early influential view saw 
infants as having only forms of proto-
humour, evolutionary vestiges from 
three primitive situations of danger: 
the threat of being hunted (leading to 
laughter at being chased); the threat of 
exposing vulnerable parts of the body 
(leading to laughter at being tickled); 
and the threat of loss of mother 
(leading to laughter at peekaboo). 
But infant humour is not restricted to 
these three situations, nor is it just a 
proto-form of ‘the real thing’. Recent 
observations show that infants are not 
just passive reactors to external stimuli; 
even in the first year of life, infants 
create and maintain novel humorous 
initiatives, actively looking for 
opportunities to elicit others’ laughter 
by playing the ‘clown’ and playfully 
provoking others by teasing them. 
Text and context
Although infants in the first year of 
life do not have complex cognitive abilities to tell or decode jokes 
as adults know them, they have 
something that may be much more 
central to humour. They have rich 
social relationships. Even in the 
humour of adults — whether in 
joke-telling or in other forms of 
comedy — it is very often the case 
that the social context is what makes 
things funny. Everyone will be familiar 
with the infectious giggling of close 
friends for no apparent reason, and 
with those social situations — in 
a church or a board meeting, for 
instance — where the very injunction 
to be serious intensifies the funniness 
of trivia. Humour is never just in the 
text of the ‘joke’ — it always involves 
context too.
One key feature of the ‘text’ of a 
joke is the presence of incongruity, 
when two different frames of reference 
collide (Koestler, 1964). Puns, for 
instance, shift our expectations from 
a predicted to an odd meaning of a 
word; at a simpler level, the absurd 
use of objects — such as an adult 
drinking from a baby bottle — can 
be incongruous. Incongruity humour 
tends to hinge on surprise, requiring 
first of all the awareness of a norm 
or a typical pattern which has been 
violated. The fact that infants can be 
surprised, even in the first few months 
of life, reveals their expectations about 
normality. For example, they react with 
surprise to unusual physical events, 
such as objects which disappear 
into thin air or that do not fall to the 
ground when dropped. They also react 
with surprise to people behaving in 
unexpected ways. But not everything 
that is incongruous or surprising is 
funny. For a surprising event or thing 
to be seen as funny rather than just 
odd or absurd or even scary, we seem 
to need a ‘playful frame’. The playful 
frame is socially constituted, bringing 
us back to the importance of the rich 
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Box 1. 
Laughter and humour in atypical development.
Clowning and playful teasing can be used as an index of interpersonal understanding. There are several components to such an index.
•	 At the simplest level, the things that children find funny reveal commonalities with the things that adults find funny. Children with 
atypical patterns of development might not be moved by the same affordances for amusement.
•	 Finding the same things funny as others allows children a powerful ‘common ground’ on which to build further communicative 
understanding. Children who do not share this common ground might therefore have secondary impairments through fewer shared 
moments of emotional engagement.
•	 Clowning and teasing both reveal an interest in others’ emotional reactions and a desire to evoke them and play with them. Such 
interests are not always present; in some developmental disorders, for example in pre-school children with ASD, both clowning and 
playful teasing are impaired.
•	 Clowning and teasing both reveal the child’s awareness of a triadic link between their own action and the other person’s reaction to 
it. Occurring developmentally earlier than the more typical indices of joint attention (which posit the child’s awareness of a link be-
tween the other person and an external object), such behaviour could be used as an early indicator of joint attentional impairments.social engagements of infancy. In 
infancy, it is the emotional reactions 
of other people — their laughter, 
amusement, indignation, surprise, 
annoyance and puzzlement — which 
are the key to their funniness, which 
‘opens the doors’ of humour. These 
reactions abound in the everyday lives 
of young infants. In the second half of 
the first year, infants clown and tease 
with impunity.
Clowning and teasing
Clowning can be defined as absurd, 
often non-verbal, behaviour, involving 
violations of normal patterns of 
social life (ways of interacting with 
people or of handling objects, for 
instance) specifically to elicit or re-
elicit amusement. Often occurring 
within a pre-established playful 
context, clowning is less intrusive 
and risky than teasing. Playful teasing 
is more explicitly provocative — 
foiling intentions and violating 
expectations — in order to provoke 
emotional reactions. Teasing often 
involves playing with surprise, with 
the boundaries of accepted patterns, 
and can function to test the limits 
of someone’s reactions or of the 
tolerance of a system. Clowning still 
stays within a pre-known frame — 
here is the funny thing that made you Figure 2. Example of teasing.
Offer and withdrawal of object in hand. A 9-mon
cheekily as her father reaches out for it. Infant rlaugh earlier — and you can either 
laugh or not. But the risk involved in 
teasing opens up potentially more 
doors: you might become angry; you 
might become upset; you might tease 
back; you might not understand it and 
each response to the response offers 
new directions for the relationship. 
While clowning tends to occur within 
a pre-established playful frame, 
teasing often occurs within moments 
of neutrality or boredom, serving as 
an invitation to interaction — a strong 
way of drawing out the other.
Little clowns, big audience
What do infants specifically do to 
play the clown? Even with little 
motor control, infants as young as 
three months use what they have 
available: their faces, bodies, and 
voices. Without intending to do so, 
three month-old infants may make 
odd faces and sounds that succeed 
in arousing parents’ responses, 
often amusement and laughter. As 
they move through infancy, gaining 
more control over their actions, 
infants expand their repertoire of 
behaviour that can now be used 
intentionally to elicit laughter. They 
become clowns. By four months, 
an infant might grab onto her 
mother’s hair and shriek with delight th-old infant offers an object to her father, wiggli
epeats the offer briefly, and turns away again quias her mother laughs and tries to 
break free. By five months, she 
might imitate her father blowing 
raspberries into the air. By six 
months, she can repeatedly knock 
over a tower of blocks carefully 
built up by an older sibling. By nine 
months, she might wave her ‘sweaty’ 
feet in the air inviting mother to smell 
them, or lift her shirt to expose her 
navel. Each of these behaviours 
invites a response from the infant’s 
social partner, and if done in order 
to initiate or re-elicit amusement, 
is an act of clowning. In fact, these 
behaviours — violating norms, 
imitating odd behaviour, violating 
others’ constructions, and acting 
profanely — are categorically similar 
to those used by circus clowns and 
some comedians to amuse audiences 
(see Figure 1 for an example 
of an infant imitating her great 
grandmother’s ‘snoring’ face).
Yet how do infants know these 
behaviours can be amusing? The 
answer, in a word, is companions. 
Research observing parents 
attempting to amuse their infants 
supports what most of us have 
seen outside of the laboratory. 
When parents try to elicit smiling 
and laughter, even from infants as 
young as three months, they do ng it to attract attention to it, then withdraws it 
ckly as her father reaches out again.
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Box 2.
Different types of laughter in infancy.
Voiced laughs are found to be more friendly, positive and spontaneous than are unvoiced laughs (such as chuckles or polite conversa-
tional laughs).
Even in the first year of infancy, parents differentiate genuine from fake or artificial laughs, with an intermediate category of the forced 
or polite laugh. Artificial laughs sound different, with an unconvincing quality, and are often used to obtain attention or to ‘join in’ when 
others are laughing in an interaction not including the infant. Polite laughs, on the other hand, are reported in contexts where the infant 
may have had enough of some game or joke but continues to laugh in a milder and less ‘felt’ way, maintaining the social expectations of 
the routine. These are similar to comment laughs in conversation.
Genuine laughs can vary in their quality and the contexts that elicit them. There are belly laughs, deep and unstoppable; brief chuckles 
in response to something mildly amusing; giggles of joy or exuberance often during rough and tumble play; and the screaming laugh 
sometimes during tickling.
However, we don’t know much about the acoustic qualities of different kinds of infant laughter, or about parents’ ability to accurately 
distinguish these types.absurd things. Taken out of context, 
these behaviours are extreme: 
odd faces or noises; blowing on 
the infant’s face; exposing the 
infant’s tummy; flailing wildly about; 
dressing the infant or themselves in 
strange clothing; or using objects 
in odd ways. In short, they model 
absurdity for their infants. But they 
also do something more that is at 
least as important. Parents give 
clear affective messages that the 
absurd is funny. Throughout their 
clowning, parents themselves smile 
and laugh, punctuating the action 
and defining the behaviour as safe, 
playful, and amusing. And when their 
infants do things like squish up their 
faces or put household objects on 
their heads, through their amused 
responses parents unmistakably 
communicate the culture of absurdity 
as humorous.
Such a tease
From around 9 months of age, 
infants are capable of stepping 
outside the theme of an ongoing 
interaction and playfully disrupting 
it by doing what might be called 
the mis-expected. Infant teasing 
is not limited to a few standard 
types of action. It seems to occur 
as a play on any newly developed 
skill or social agreement. A new 
word that has been mastered by 
the 12-month-old can be playfully 
mis-used — “Mama” said with a 
cheeky smile while looking at the 
father, for example. A new skill — 
asking for something by pointing to 
it with a vocalisation — can be used 
playfully by an 11- or 12-month-old 
by repeatedly ‘asking’ for it and 
then refusing it with a smile. A newly 
learned gesture — such as holding out an object in order to offer it — 
can be playfully distorted by the 
9- or 10-month-old, by holding it out, 
then whipping it back as the other 
reaches out (see Figure 2 for one 
example of an infant offering and 
cheekily withdrawing an object from 
her father). 
Infants seem to play with the 
deliberate conflict of messages 
involved in offer and withdrawal, 
not just by offering and withdrawing 
objects, but also offering and 
withdrawing themselves as a whole. 
The 11-month-old who puts out her 
hands to go to her waiting dad and 
then veers away at the last minute, 
smiling broadly, is not unfamiliar 
to some of us. Perhaps the type of 
teasing most familiar to parents of 
young children is the provocative 
non-compliance that we all despair 
of — and never quite know how 
to handle. The infant who, looking 
watchfully at her mother, slowly 
reaches out a finger towards a hot 
cup of tea (after weeks of complete 
reliability in not touching hot things), 
is playing with her own expected 
pattern of behaviour and with her 
mother’s reaction. The range of 
things infants can do to tease their 
parents seems as large as the 
expectations parents have of the 
infants.
Teasing is paradigmatic of 
unscripted conversation and is 
inherently relational. It needs an 
intentional partner to occur at all 
and to complete its meaning (for 
example, to determine its meaning 
as naughtiness or as humour). 
More importantly, you cannot tease 
someone unless they respond in 
an appropriately reciprocal way. No 
one would, literally or figuratively, say “boo” to a goose which didn’t 
respond with either alarm or attack. 
It is fundamentally the response 
(and its anticipation) which allows 
teasing, and it is teasing which 
seduces the other into action. 
Teasing involves a curious mixture 
of opposites and contradictory 
messages — of engagement with 
the other in the moment as well 
as simultaneous stepping outside 
of engagement, of respect and 
violation. 
A playful tease is an interpersonal 
intrusion that always carries an 
element of risk: the action could be 
damaging and the interaction could 
quickly deteriorate or end. But it could 
also cause the relationship to fast 
track through several introductory 
levels, catapulting it into greater 
closeness. In fact, this may be why 
we are impelled to explore and 
test boundaries, take risks with 
relationships and with the smooth 
harmony of interactions. It may 
explain why we seek to create these 
‘breakdowns’. Nakano argues that 
we have an ‘incident affinity’ — we 
are attracted precisely to incidents 
or events which break fluency and 
smoothness and, when successful, 
raise communication to a higher level. 
Perhaps teasing, as with any risk, can 
be transformative. 
Teasing, clowning and other minds
Teasing and clowning are important 
markers of the awareness of other 
minds. Joint attention — when two 
people knowingly attend to the 
same object — is one commonly 
used index of this awareness. Prior 
discussions, however, have excluded 
the actions and events that infants 
engineer as a focal point for joint 
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 attention. Both teasing and clowning 
show infants’ awareness of this 
triadic link, and challenge earlier 
views.
Teasing also tells us about infants’ 
awareness of others’ intentions. Even 
the simplest teasing that infants 
do — for example, to offer someone 
an object and then whip it back as 
they reach for it — requires that 
infants predict the other’s actions 
and expectations (that the other will 
hold their hand out and will expect 
you to release the object). Teasing, 
therefore, involves playing in the 
realm of minds. Indeed, when an 
adult teases an infant — with an 
ambiguous action such as blocking 
the infant’s hand or pulling an object 
back — most infants immediately 
look up at the adult’s face, knowing 
the face will reveal the intention. 
Understanding others’ intentions 
when they are themselves teased, 
however, may not develop until the 
second year of infancy.
The link between mind knowledge 
and teasing is in a way very simple. 
Daniel Stern wrote in 1985 that “you 
can’t tease another person unless 
you can correctly guess what is in 
their minds and make them suffer 
or laugh because of their knowing”. 
Looking at mind as embodied (rather 
than as a hidden and internal entity) 
allows us to see how infants are 
drawn into understanding others’ 
intentions and expectations by 
engaging in playful interactions. 
Infant teasing not only reveals what 
infants know about others’ embodied 
intentions and expectations, but 
reveals a powerful process of 
exploration by the infant of the nature 
and boundaries of mind — others’ as 
well as their own. 
Teasing in other animals
Although there is no shortage of 
evidence about play in non-human 
animals, curiously there appear to 
be no reports of clowning. Whether 
this is a function of our limited 
observations or of something more 
fundamentally characteristic of 
clowning is unclear. Teasing, on 
the other hand, is more apparent. 
The Internet is replete with clips 
of animals playing with objects 
and other animals, and some of 
these include specific examples 
of teasing. In one compelling 
example (https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=fPXkUXXFoCw), a wild gibbon teases a pair of tiger cubs, swinging 
down on tree limbs to tweak the cubs’
ears, yank on their tails, hang just out 
of reach over their heads, and then 
scooting deftly up into the canopy 
before the cubs can retaliate. 
Another video (https://www.
youtube.com/watch?v=t4eJvem3nOY)
shows a captive dolphin taunting 
a seagull with a fish. The dolphin 
cradles the fish in its open mouth in 
full view but just beyond the gull’s 
reach, then ducks under water 
thwarting the gull’s attempt to snatch 
it. Other clips catch monkeys teasing 
dogs and cats. In one (https://www.
youtube.com/watch?v=TuF0qmzj9UI),
a young monkey skips around a 
kitten that is relaxing on a bench, 
grabs her tail, jumps back awaiting 
her reaction, then skips back within 
reach. 
Each of these examples convinces 
the viewer that teasing is not 
exclusive to human beings. Our 
close cousins, chimpanzees, have 
also been observed teasing where 
the motive for teasing is linked to 
social status. Specifically, low ranking 
chimpanzees appear to tease others 
out of boredom, while high ranking 
chimps seem to tease as an act of 
control. The abundance of teasing in 
other animals tells us two things — 
that neither the ability to perceive 
other minds, nor the desire to play 
with them is the prerogative of 
humans alone.
The meaning of funny
Humour is universal, but not 
everything is funny. Infants smile 
and laugh very early in development, 
eventually clowning and teasing their
way towards their first birthdays. 
As they discover others’ reactions 
and indeed, others’ minds, they also 
discover the meaning of ‘funny’, a 
construct that varies across and 
within cultures, regions, families 
and even dyads. Infants become 
attuned to the nuances in humour 
through their social relationships, 
which create the practice of 
contexts of humorous exchange. 
Others’ reactions to the infant’s 
actions — intentionally humorous 
or otherwise — inform the infant 
about what is funny. At the same 
time, parents tutor the infant in the 
comedic potential of the absurd 
through their own odd actions, 
which they pair with positive affect 
conveying joy and safety. These interactions, initially in the dyad and 
eventually in larger social contexts, 
result in the infant’s initiation into 
the ‘culture of funniness’ as an 
active and engaged participant. 
Research shows that infants as 
young as 5 months will laugh at 
absurd events — such as a stranger 
wearing a red ball as a clown 
nose — even when their parents 
remain emotionally neutral. It could 
be that even the infant’s brief history 
of humorous interactions and their 
(limited) knowledge of the world 
suffice to allow them to extract 
humour from such situations despite 
their tender age, recognizing ‘funny’ 
in the thing itself.
Humour affords infants with rich 
social and cognitive opportunities, 
perhaps explaining nature’s 
developmental prioritisation of 
smiling and laughter. Similarly, 
humour research provides scientists 
with rich opportunities to know 
what infants know as they are 
coming to know it. Humour may 
be funny, but humour research is 
serious science.
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